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Abstract 
The Coronavirus (Covid-19) poses interesting questions for social and political 
thought. These include the nature and limits of the ethical responsibility of the state, 
personal liberty and collective interests, human dignity, and state surveillance. As 
many countries throughout the world declared states of emergency, some of the major 
questions in political philosophy become suddenly highly relevant. Foucault’s writings 
on biopolitical securitization and Agamben’s notion of the state of exception take on 
a new reality, as do the classical arguments of utilitarianism and libertarianism.  In this 
paper, I discuss six main philosophical responses to the pandemic, including 
provocative interventions made by Agamben, Badieu, and Zizek, Latour on the 
governance of life and death as well as the Kantian perspective of Habermas on 
human dignity. 
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Six political philosophies in search of a virus: 
Critical perspectives on the coronavirus 
pandemic 
 
Major pandemics have brought about epochal change. The Black Death in the mid-
fourteenth century killed more than half of Europe’s population; the diseases (mostly 
Smallpox) brought by the Spanish to the Americas in the sixteenth century killed as 
much as 90% of the indigenous population; Cholera defined the nineteenth century; 
the 1918 Flu killed more than 50 to 100 million people world-wide; AIDS claimed c 32 
million lives.  It remains to be seen what the long-term impact of the current 
Coronavirus will be. It is clear that the scale of the pandemic at the moment (April 
2020) requires some serious reflection on how societies deal with major infectious 
diseases. The economic, societal, and epidemiological implications are as yet unclear, 
due not least to insufficient information on the scale of the pandemic and when a 
vaccine will be available for mass distribution on a global level. This is also not likely 
to be the last such pandemic. It clearly is part of a new wave of cross-species global 
viruses since the 2003 SARS virus and Swine Flu in 2009-10, which killed more than 
100,000 people. For these reasons, the current situation, despite its uncertainty, is very 
likely not to be exceptional. Indeed, the current exceptionality may become the new 
normality.  It may transpire to be case that the social and political consequences will 
be greater than the direct epidemiological impact in terms of infections and deaths.  
Virologists and epidemiologists are now not surprisingly in much demand and 
command considerable political influence. Already, within the space of a few months, 
many countries have declared states of emergency and have in several cases effectively 
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shut down the economy, or large sectors of economic activity. Social life has been 
transformed, even militarized, by new regimes of social distancing, face masks, self-
isolation, alternative handshakes etc. In this paper I would like to consider the 
implications from the perspective of political philosophy and social theory of the kinds 
of political epistemologies that follow from the current crisis and the dark arts of 
epidemiological governance. As governments are now beholden to epidemiologists, 
when they are not at war against them as is the Trump presidency, it is evident that 
major political implications follow from their often controversial advice as well as 
from the selective interpretations that governments make of such advice.1 It would be 
naive not to see in the emerging kinds of governance political epistemology at work, 
glimpses of a dystopia future, but also counter discourses.
In terms of moral and political philosophy, I see six main responses to the current 
pandemic. My aim in this paper is to look at the current pandemic through the lens of 
these philosophies. The pandemic has already attracted the attention of several noted 
philosophers, who in the footsteps of Michel Foucault’s pioneering analysis of plagues 
and surveillance in Discipline and Punish, see a new authoritarian regime of governance 
taking shape (Foucault 1977: 195-200). Most prominently, Agamben has highlighted 
the spectre of biopolitical securitization. However, there are other perspectives that 
need to be brought into the picture. As I shall try to show, while the pandemic raises 
fundamental philosophical questions concerning the political and ethical 
responsibility of the state, the way we look at these questions is very much influenced 
by philosophical positions themselves, since in many cases philosophical ideas have 
shaped the politics of the pandemic. 
 
1 See Jan Zielonka on some of the issues that arise when medical advisors are given new 
powers https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/who-should-be-charge-
doctors-or-politicians/ 
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1). The first is surely utilitarianism.  The initial response of the UK government to the 
outbreak of the Coronavirus reflected classical utilitarianism, namely how to maximise 
the collective interest. In this case, which could be mistaken for Social Darwinism but 
is closer to utilitarianism, the collective interest is to increase immunity even if 
significant numbers of people die. This is the now notorious doctrine of ‘herd 
immunity’.2 Now, while this has been much ridiculed and government policy has 
shifted (once it became apparent that the scale of deaths – possibly more than 200,000 
– would be greater than what the health system could accommodate), utilitarian 
political theory has persuasive appeal. It is not to be equated with material gain, as is 
often thought.  Its basic premise is that the greatest good should always be sought 
after. This may demand that the ends justify the means, but it is generally understood, 
as in the writings of Peter Singer, that one’s interest is not greater than the interest of 
the greatest number. However, as a practical philosophy, it needs to be able to 
command the required means to achieve the desired end. This is where things get 
complicated. Is the desired end the elimination of the disease (which is impossible in 
the absence of a vaccine) or the best possible outcome for the majority of people, i.e. 
natural immunity? Herd immunity, it became quickly clear, could be both a means 
and an end, but the reality is that it does not work as a means to the end, due to the 
extent of the death rate that would have to be tolerated.  
Utilitarianism always leads to disadvantages for some. If these disadvantages are not 
great, it may be the only way to achieve a desirable societal goal. It is conceivably 
possible that utilitarianism may have been adopted in the UK if the health system 
could accommodate the required numbers of infected patients. It briefly became a 
policy in the Netherlands before it was abandoned.3  Lockdown, self-isolation and 
social distancing are other means, but the end is now generally agreed to be the 
 
2 See https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-pandemic-herd-
immunity-uk-boris-johnson/608065/ 
3 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-52135814 
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suppression of the disease rather than delaying the emergence of a peak (Taylor 2020).  
However, this ‘end’ is less a normative end than a means for a purpose that remains 
unclear. Utilitarianism works well when the collective good is easily identifiable and 
can be achieved by a means that does not produce major disadvantages. It also 
requires, what is not available in many instances, complete knowledge of the relevant 
facts, within a limited time frame (see Wagner 2000). This boils down to mass testing, 
the absence of which means decisions have to be made without complete knowledge. 
The failure of utilitarianism in the UK in March 2020 is less a failure of utilitarian 
philosophy than a failure of politics and science.  
2). The Kantian alternative. What then is the alternative to utilitarianism? An 
influential body of thought that goes back to Immanuel Kant would posit the centrality 
of human dignity instead of the elusive common good. In a recent interview, Jürgen 
Habermas, the leading political philosopher in the world today, asserted the Kantian 
principle that ‘the efforts of the state to save every single human life must have 
absolute priority over a utilitarian offsetting of the undesirable economic costs’.4  On 
this view, the dignity of the individual person is the over-riding normative force in 
determining concrete policies, even if in this case it is very unclear what these might 
be.5 This is generally too the standpoint of the political philosophy of John Rawls, for 
whom utilitarianism neglects too much the individual and the requirement for 
equality between individuals. According to The Theory of Justice, a just society should 
be organised on the basis of principles of justice that derive from the interests of the 
individual. 
 
4 https://www.fr.de/kultur/gesellschaft/juergen-habermas-coronavirus-krise-covid19-
interview-13642491.html 
5 See also a newspaper piece by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, a philosopher in the Frankfurt 
School tradition, who makes a strong case for the Kantian argument based on human dignity, 
https://www.fr.de/kultur/gesellschaft/corona-krise-wuerde-menschen-unverrechenbar-
13636694.html 
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The Kantian standpoint opposes the utilitarian position in not appealing to the 
common interest, the maxim that the end justifies the means, since this might not be 
compatible with respect for the individual. To take an extreme scenario, the Kantian 
position would require the state to save the lives of those who may be too ill to be 
saved even if this meant resources may be unavailable to those who could be saved. 
But it must try, even if treatment to those less infirm and with greater chances of 
recovery should be declined on the grounds of what can only be a first in the queue 
solution. In other words, the ethical obligation of the state is to save all lives and not 
to distinguish which ones are of greater value. The utilitarian position is not reducible 
to instrumentalism, as is perhaps suggested by Habermas’s remark, in that it is not a 
matter of the instrumental interest in keeping the economy going but of maximising 
the common interest.  
There is then a clear difference between the utilitarian and the Kantian responses.  Both 
indirectly are operative – if not explicitly – in current responses to the Coronavirus, 
either as policies or as critiques of policies. They are compelling arguments for either. 
Perhaps the advantage of the Kantian position is that it does not put a price on the life 
of a person or seek to give it a weighting in order to reach the higher goal of the 
common interest. On the other side, for the utilitarian saving some lives may not be 
enough, so why not try to save as many as possible.  
In any case, I would argue that despite the rising death toll the appeal to human 
dignity on its own is not enough. There is also the question of human security. As 
declared in the UN General Assembly resolution 66/290, ‘human security is an 
approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-
cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’.6 The current 
approach to the pandemic, in so far as it is guided by human dignity, does not give 
sufficient recognition to the question of livelihoods and other problems that lockdown 
 
6 https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/ 
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presents. Dignity without security is not a solution, as is evidenced by the shocking 
death rate in care homes, quite aside from other problems such as the neglect of 
patients with other serious illnesses, the rise in in domestic abuse and mental health 
that lockdown has created, especially in countries such as Spain where it has been 
taken to an extreme level of confinement.  
The conflict between these positions ultimately in practice will resolve around 
concrete policies on striking a balance between controlling the pandemic, managing 
the economic consequences and the social costs rather than the pursuit of abstract 
aspirations. Even if we disagree on the ends, we may agree on practical policies that 
could, if successfully applied, deliver satisfactory outcomes (for instance in slowing 
down the spread of the pandemic). But this is where another problem arises: the 
negative consequences arising from the means that many governments have decided 
on in order to achieve their aims. One set of policies resolves around social distancing 
and self-isolation and the other around lockdown. There is a third, which we can 
discount for now since the option no longer exists, namely population-wide testing, 
tracing and isolating, as embarked on by South Korea with considerable success. The 
problem with the first is that it is probably not adequate to curtail the spread of 
pandemic (except in cases where it is of limited threat – in which case the problem 
does not exist). The second, lockdown is more effective in supressing the spread of the 
pandemic but presents problems of considerable concern to libertarians.  
3) This, then, is a third philosophical position: libertarianism. The measures employed 
by many governments to combat the pandemic from a libertarian perspective encroach 
on personal freedom. For libertarians, there is nothing more sacred than the liberty of 
the individual. Enforced social distancing might be accommodated in this worldview 
but lockdown is a remedy worse than the disease. From even a moderate libertarian 
perspective, the reduction of the death rate does not justify extreme restrictions on 
freedom of the individual where these restrictions entail the removal of rights 
previously enjoyed.  For extreme libertarians death is preferable to the loss of 
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freedom. 7  Libertarians, not too surprisingly, feel uncomfortable with the current 
situation, which also forces them to face some of the unpalatable implications of their 
philosophy (which in practical terms is not much different than what radical right-
wing groups in the US, including Trump, want, namely the cessation of all kinds of 
confinement). Here we find an interesting contradiction between the champions of 
liberty who are also the opponents of social justice. 
Libertarians may be selfish and have nothing to contribute to collective solutions, but 
nonetheless they have a point in drawing attention to the problem of liberty and where 
the limits of state power should be drawn. Since the outbreak of the Coronavirus in 
China in December 2019, states throughout the world have imposed far-reaching curbs 
on the liberty of individuals. States of emergency have been declared in many leading 
democracies ostensibly to protect the elderly, despite creating a range of other 
problems. What at first seemed possible only in a dictatorship, has now become 
normalised in constitutional democracies everywhere. Several countries have imposed 
– Spain and Italy for example – severe lockdowns that require citizens to remain 
indoors for a period in excess of a month. In Spain children were locked indoors for 
six weeks.  What is the aim here – fear of the virus or fear of the rise of the extreme 
right? In Spain, the extreme measures taken with the mobilization of the Civil Guard 
are in part a pre-emptive strike against the extreme right, so that the government 
cannot be criticised for standing idly by as large numbers of the elderly die. Ali 
Weiwei’s macabre depiction of Wuhan in March 2020 a month or so later became easily 
applied to many western cities.8 Weiwei sees the pandemic as a symptom of a deeper 
illness that is social and political. As far as the protection of the elderly is concerned, 
 
7 For a discussion of some of these issues, see Alison Hills’ article 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/10/sunbathing-park-deep-moral-
questions-philosophers-coronavirus-individual.  
See also https://theweek.com/articles/901738/what-libertarians-response-coronavirus 
8 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/08/china-ill-not-only-coronavirus-
communist-party-control 
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there is also some selectivity in that care homes, which have witnessed the worst of 
the viral onslaught, have been relatively neglected if not abandoned sites of death in 
many countries. 
The political and moral philosophies discussed in the foregoing, with their typical 
concern with the individual, do not seem adequate to understand the deeper social 
reality and political significance of the current crisis, which is difficult to see only in 
terms of liberty, the common good or human dignity. The Coronavirus is clearly not 
just one thing but takes many forms when it comes to politics and as a consequence it 
can serve different purposes. Hence the need for more critical approaches than the 
lament for lost liberty or the cry of human dignity. 
4) The Allure of Foucault: Agamben on Biopolitical Securitization and States of 
Exception. From the perspective of political philosophy, current developments point 
in the direction of a new order of governance close to what the Italian philosopher, 
Giorgio Agamben, calls a permanent state of exception (Agamben 2005). The fourth 
response is thus the Foucauldian one of the surveillance of space that arose with 
modernity. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault introduced his famous concept of 
panopticism with a discussion of disciplinary mechanisms that were created in the late 
seventeenth century to control plaques: ‘If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of 
exclusion, which to a certain extent provided the model for and general form of the 
great Confinement, then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects’ (Foucault 1977: 
198). The quarantine of the city by means of a ‘lock up’ marked the emergence of the 
disciplined society around ‘a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, 
supervising and correcting the abnormal’.   
The Foucaultdian theme of biopolitical securitization9 has been taken up by Agamben 
in the context of state of emergency and has led to an interesting debate among Italian 
 
9 See Phillip Sarasin’s assessment relevance of Foucault’s writings on biopolitics 
https://www.fsw.uzh.ch/foucaultblog/essays/254/understanding-corona-with-foucault 
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and French philosophers.10 For Agamben, the use of a state of exception as a normal 
paradigm for government is deeply worrying.  It leads to the militarization of the 
polity and indefinite extension of the state of exception. It also creates a generalised 
condition of fear and anxiety among individuals that ‘translates into an authentic need 
for situations of collective panic for which the epidemic provides once again the ideal 
pretext. Therefore, in a perverse vicious circle, the limitations of freedom imposed by 
governments are accepted in the name of a desire for safety that was created by the 
same governments that are now intervening to satisfy it.’   
Responses to Agamben, whose contribution in some ways is less than serious, have 
been quick to point out that this interpretation amounts to conspiracy theory. Is the 
state really using the pandemic to create a permanent state of exception? Probably not; 
the Italian state seems incapable of even basic governance, let alone a sanitary 
dictatorship. Europe’s most extreme lockdown in Spain has been implemented by a 
socialist government. It is true too that many governments have resisted the 
opportunity to resort to extreme measures of biopolitical securitization that might 
follow from Foucault and Agamben. There is also the basic conflict between the state 
power and capitalism, since both are not compatible. However, there are clear trends 
that point to the rapid expansion of militarized forms of surveillance that cannot be 
fully accounted for as necessary measures to control the pandemic. While Agamben 
may have exaggerated the political instrumentalisation of the pandemic – as a case of 
an opportunity too good to lose – the important point he makes is that the state of 
exception is now becoming the new normal art of governance. In Hungary, Orban 
rules by decree11; the UK government has been given exceptional powers; in the USA 
Trump claims to have ‘total control’. The constant renewal of states of emergency with 
enforced lockdowns – not to be mistaken for requirements of social distancing – is 
 
10 See the debate https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus-and-philosophers/ 
11  https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/crown-king-how-did-viktor-orban-turn-covid-
19-political-weapon 
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unprecedented in democracies (even if according to Foucault such modes of discipline 
come with modernity). It is difficult to account for such decrees in terms of 
utilitarianism or in terms of the Kantian concern with human dignity. It is true that 
confinement imposed by a democratic order is different from that of a dictatorship, 
but democracies can be capable of authoritarianism, as examples such as Brexit 
demonstrate. The implications of perpetual lockdown also go beyond the concerns of 
libertarians with personal liberty, for they go to the core of democracy (libertarians are 
not normally concerned about democracy, only individual liberty). Democracy 
however understood is based on the centrality of the public and deliberation and 
cannot fare well in pandemic situations with emergency government the order of the 
day. 
Until recently, the state has been widely seen as impotent in the face of globalization. 
The pandemic underscores this, but we have seen that in fact the state now holds near 
total control over populations thanks to the virus. Unlike Muslims, this is an Other 
than is within everyone. It thus presents the perfect opportunity for a new kind of 
securitization, bio-security.  As Agamben says in a clarification to his original 
intervention: ‘A society that lives in a permanent state of emergency cannot be a free 
one. We effectively live in a society that has sacrificed freedom to so-called “security 
reasons” and as a consequence has condemned itself to living in a permanent state of 
fear and insecurity.’ This condition will outlive the state of emergency. Drawing on his 
notion of bare life,12 he writes: ‘It is evident that Italians are prepared to sacrifice 
practically everything – normal living conditions, social relations, work, even 
friendships and religious or political beliefs – to avoid the danger of falling ill. The 
naked life, and the fear of losing it, is not something that brings men and women 
together, but something that blinds and separates them’. 
In western societies, it may be the case that the virus is the new Other. But it is more 
complicated. In India, the Cornavirus is explicitly being used to further communal 
 
12 See Agamben (1998). 
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tensions. The state is more aggressively testing Muslims for the virus (on the pretext 
of a large Muslim gathering which occurred pre-Lockdown), but not Hindus (despite 
a preponderance of large Hindu-gatherings after lockdown). This furthers racialised 
narratives of the Other as ‘unclean’. So at a biological level, the virus is within 
everyone, sociologically this is not the case in many societies – distribution, 
surveillance and narratives circulate and attach to certain communities far more than 
others. In India, for many people, this is understood as a further development of the 
underlying ‘Muslim problem’ and has even been peddled as being a ‘Muslim 
conspiracy.13 
I do believe Agamben has an important critical point to make, even if he has no 
concrete proposal to make on what an appropriate response to the pandemic should 
be.  There is certainly an excess of control and as always the less well-off fare worse. 
Governments are now employing digital programmes for mobile data tracking, apps 
to record personal contacts, CCTV networks equipped with facial recognition, the 
proposal of the UK government to use “back-end” access into Bluetooth connections 
to enable contact tracing. These new technologies are creating lucrative new markets 
for the extraction, sale and analysis of private data.14 The state of emergencies will 
come to an end, we can assume, but these technologies will continue and state 
surveillance will also be given a tremendous boost by the current crisis. But what is 
the alternative? Hardly the proposal of Jair Bolsonaro, the extreme-right wing 
President of Brazil, to do nothing and see the pandemic as a hoax, which is effectively 
 
13 My thanks to Neal Harris and Priya Raghavan for this perspective 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/coronavirus-outbreak-india-blamed-muslims-
200418143252362.html 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/13/coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-targeting-
muslims-spread-in-india 
14  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/14/growth-in-surveillance-may-be-hard-to-
scale-back-after-coronavirus-pandemic-experts-say 
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what Agamben has said in what was perhaps an infelicitous formulation in calling the 
pandemic ‘an invention’. 
In addition to surveillance administered by the state, there is also the societal 
implications of social distancing. In another contribution, Agamben refers to ‘social 
distancing’ as a pointing to a new kind of social order: ‘the current health emergency 
can be considered as the laboratory in which the new political and social devices that 
await humanity are prepared’.15 In sum, Agamben draws attention to a range of issues 
that the current crisis raises for democracy. Many of these go back to Foucault’s notion 
of the self as constructed in relations of power, such as those that are now evidenced 
in the new technologies of subjectification, namely social distancing, face-masks and 
self-isolation. The desire for safety creates even greater dangers that are internalised 
as freedom and perpetuated by fear. While Agamben underplays the need to find 
solutions to the pandemic, he offers a compelling account of the implications for 
democracy and social life of some of the measures being taken to deal with the 
pandemic. Agamben’s account is perhaps more compelling when applied to non-
Western contexts; for example, in Nigeria more people have been killed by police 
violence to ensure lockdown than have been killed by the Coronovirus (on latest 
figures).16 There is also the question of whether the home is really a sanctuary of safety 
from the contagion of the public realm. One thinks here of how relative these 
distinctions are in many cases, for example the favela in Brazilian cities where the 
home is not a place of refuge due to dense populations or the situation approaching 
the decimation of indigenous people in the Amazon regions. 
Reading Agamben’s reflections, one is struck by the realization that what we are 
witnessing is a lethal anti-liberal pathogen eating through the fabric of social life and 
of democracy. The social bond is itself the danger. Habermas’s Kantian appeal to 
human dignity offers little respite, not least as it is fully compatible with a state of 
 
15 In Spanish: https://ficciondelarazon.org/tag/coronavirus/ 
16 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52317196 
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exception if that is what is required to protect life itself. Is there an alternative position 
to what could be taken to be ‘right-wing postmodernism’, to use a term to describe 
extreme scepticism of any political programme or normative position on the grounds 
that it always represents someone’s interest?17 
To answer this question it seems to me to be essential to bring in the perspective of 
social agency. Agamben inherited Foucault’s weakness in reducing social agency to 
domination. Populations under lockdown conditions may be the image of what 
Foucault initially characterised as the disciplined condition of modernity.  But social 
actors are also active in contesting domination and seeking to subvert control. This 
perspective is entirely missing in Agamben’s account. Could the Coronavirus open up 
an alternative social order? It is not only the Alt-Right who are mobilising against state 
surveillance. Foucault – in later writings – after all held that power entails resistance.  
5) Post-Capitalism and Radical Politics: Slavoj Žižek (2020), the prominent Slovenian 
Lacanian philosopher, who perhaps reflects a left-wing postmodernism, offers a 
different and more radical response to Agamben’s emphasis on biopolitical subjection.  
For him, in a recent book, Pandemic! Covid-19 shakes the world the choice, after the 
pandemic, is ‘barbarism or some form of reinvented communism’.18 Žižek sees an 
opportunity for the reinvention of communism. The pandemic reveals the virus of 
capitalism. The current crisis is a call to free ourselves from the tyranny of the market. 
Governments are suddenly engaging in what looks like a major attack on capitalism 
with state sponsored employment for millions of people and a world-wide suspension 
of consumerism. In the UK, the hard right-wing government of Johnson that brought 
 
17 See https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/the-coronavirus-and-right-wing-
postmodernism/ 
18  See also debate with contributions by Judith Butler and Byund-Chul Han in Spanish 
https://www.lahaine.org/mundo.php/la-filosofia-y-el-coronavirus 
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us Brexit had to commit, however much reluctantly, to state spending on a scale 
unimaginable by any left-wing government.  Neoliberalism is dead as a political 
project, even if it lives on in other forms (e.g. Brexit).  Capitalism seems to be on hold 
for now. But for how long? And who will benefit in the end?  
While there is much that Žižek agrees on with Agamben, his conclusions are different. 
The desire for survival, he claims, will create new bonds of solidarity. However, it is 
very unclear how this will happen. As the Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han has 
commented, the nature of a virus is to separate people. This, after all, is what social 
distancing and self-isolation is supposed to do. It is difficult to see in these 
developments signs of an alternative political order based on solidarity. It is true that 
in the past major pandemics did lead to progressive change. The 1918 Flu led to the 
creation of national health care systems, for instance (Spinney 2017). The Black Death, 
which reduced the supply of labour, led to improved conditions for workers, at least 
in Europe. It is therefore not impossible that out of the current crisis will come some 
improvements in public policy and a more humanised kind of capitalism. However, it 
is unlikely that something like communism will emerge, even if some kinds of 
predatory capitalism will be much reduced (Airbnb, Deliveroo for example). Others, 
such as Amazon, will survive and prosper. This is also the conclusion of the French 
philosopher Alain Badiou, who is generally identified as a Maoist, in an inspiring 
essay ‘On the Epidemic Condition’.19 Nonetheless, self-isolation offers a moment for 
reflection on the future: ‘As for those of us who desire a real change in the political 
conditions of this country, we must take advantage of this epidemic interlude, and 
even of the – entirely necessary – isolation, to work on new figures of politics, on the 
project of new political sites, and on the trans-national progress of a third stage of 
communism after the brilliant one of its invention and the – interesting but ultimately 
defeated – stage of its statist experimentation’.  
 
19 See his blog  https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4608-on-the-epidemic-situation 
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A possibly more pertinent interpretation on the post-capitalist position, is Bruno 
Latour’s suggest that the health crisis may be an early sign of a new age of 
Anthropocene politics: the current biopolitical securitization that we are witnessing is 
a ‘dress rehearsal’ for climate change.20 It cannot be a coincidence that the health crisis 
is occurring at the same time as the ecological crisis has taken on a new urgency. As 
he also argued in another recent essay21, ‘the time to fight is now so that the economic 
recovery, once the crisis is over, does not bring back the same old climate regime that 
we have been trying, quite vainly, to fight against so far.’ It is true that the health crisis 
has brought out the best in people – solidarity, recognition of the importance of health 
care –, but it has also brought out the worst: an ultra Brexit by stealth; the Brazilian 
government’s disguising the Coronavirus as a cover-up for the destruction of the 
Amazon; quarantine shaming; the stigmatism and xenophobia of social groups. .  
6) Nudge-Theory. Badieu, and in a stronger form, Žižek, represent the left-wing 
response to the current crisis. There is perhaps another position, which is less a 
political philosophy than a very recent development in behavioural science, namely 
nudge theory (Sunstein and Thaler 2008). The UK was briefly the laboratory for this 
new social philosophy, in part following on from the failure of what I characterised as 
the utilitarian philosophy of herd immunity, which it also supported with the view 
that fatigue can quickly set in from a too early implementation of lockdown policies. 
According to this new and influential school of thought, people do not act rationally 
(Brexit is ample proof of this). What we need to understand is the nature of irrationality 
in order that it can be controlled.22 Now, such methods of control are not authoritarian 
 
20 https://critinq.wordpress.com/2020/03/26/is-this-a-dress-rehearsal/ 
21 In Opinion, 30 March, 2020 
22  https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-how-the-uk-government-is-using-behavioural-
science-134097 
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as such (as in lockdown policies) but ‘nudges’ and can be done with the support of 
people who believe that they are making their own choices without the heavy hand of 
the state forcing them. Nudge theory is in fact quite close to Foucault’s later notion of 
discipline as governmentality, which requires liberty for its effectiveness. The 
interesting thing is that in the case of the governance of the pandemic it was to deemed 
have not worked, since it did not bring about major changes to behaviour within the 
time frame required, and was abandoned in favour of more stringent and fast-acting 
measures that do not reply on voluntary actions (such as voluntary self-isolation, 
handwashing etc). However, it does remain as an additional technology of governance 
and we are likely to hear more of it, especially when states of emergency are slowly 
lifted and ‘normal life’ returns. But as with all approaches that focus on only human 
behaviour, there is a total neglect of the structural context in which behaviour occurs.  
All six political philosophies, which I have all too briefly characterised in the 
foregoing, have something to offer on the current situation. While Žižek sees in the 
present predicament, the seeds of radical change, Agamben draws attention to 
declarations of emergency as anti-democratic attempts to render populations docile 
and obedient. These theorists bring important critical perspectives to bear on the older 
political philosophies that are reflected in utilitarianism, Kantianism, and 
libertarianism. Clearly, governments need to control the spread of the virus, but more 
reflection is needed on the degree of militarization that is required to do this 
successfully and what is really acceptable to a democracy. Simple appeals to liberty 
are not enough for an alternative, not least as for now lockdowns etc have considerable 
public support (although there are signs, as the peak has now passed, of greater 
questioning). Perhaps therefore a more serious question is less liberty – which is 
almost always a question of individual liberty – than democracy.  In any case, 
capitalism, as Foucault was well aware needs liberty, and cannot function in totally 
disciplined societies.  
If there is a single conclusion to be drawn from these philosophies, it is that the 
Coronavirus is more than a pathogen that threatens the lives of many people, but 
Gerard Delanty 
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democracy is also in danger from the recent experiments with emergency 
government 23 . These may not result in a permanent state of exception or the 
suspension of democracy – letting aside the Anthropocene scenario of extreme climate 
change requiring long-term states of exception – and the solution is not a simple 
restoration of individual liberty.  Perhaps then more significant in the long-term will 
be new technologies of emergency governance that are now taking shape in large-scale 
societal experimentation with the technocratic management of populations in rapidly 
changing circumstances. Governments have acquired considerable technocratic power 
over their populations, which have been disciplined in the late Foucauldian sense of 
the term to desire safety over liberty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 For some accounts, see Fassin and Pandolfi (2003); Honnig (2009); White (2020). 
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